What is needed to resolve the Iran nuclear issue

Today, May 28, 2025, I am expanding my blog from its initial scope of documenting the reporting of my grandfather, Don Martin, as the New York Herald war correspondent in WWI, to include my current and continuing interests in the conundrum about Iran’s nuclear program and more generally about International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) international safeguards, with which I have been involved since 1985. 

I start with What is needed to resolve the Iran nuclear issue.

A possible new nuclear deal with Iran is receiving much attention. The Foreign Affairs article of May 26, 2025, by Richard Nephew poses the question “Is a Good Iran Deal Possible?” More than a new deal is needed to resolve the Iran nuclear issue, as presented in this post. 

 There are two threads in the long-standing Iran nuclear drama that it is important to recognize and take intoaccount. The primary one is Iran’s Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations;the other is an extra-NPT agreement, first embodied in JCPOA and now innegotiation between Iran and the U.S. Today, Iran is not fully in compliance with its NPT obligations, and JCPOA provisions are in limbo. 

                                                            NPT 

Iran has the NPT in force since 1972. Under its NPT comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) with IAEA, Iran is obligated to declare all nuclear material to IAEA on a continuing basis. IAEA has evidence that Iran’s declaration of nuclear material Is not complete. 

 As it does for all NPT states, IAEA applies safeguardsmeasures to verify and maintain continuity of knowledge on Iran’s declared nuclear material. The objective of IAEA safeguards is to provide timely detection of a diversion of nuclear material for purposes unknown. The timely detection period is 1 month for uranium enriched to 20% or more but can be short for material placed under continuous remote monitoring. 

 The CSA as written in 1972 focused on nuclear material declared by the State. It has limitations on IAEA’s authority to investigate potential undeclared nuclear material or activities. This was dramatically shown by the clandestine nuclear weapon program that went undetected under the noses of IAEA inspectors in Iraq. As a result, NPT States agreed that for the IAEA to provide the desired assurance that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or material in a state, IAEA needed more information and access than provided by the CSA. 

 In response, IAEA Member States, through the Board of Governors, developed the “Model Additional Protocol to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards,” INFCIRC/540 (1997). This “AP” has been voluntarily adopted by 142 NPT States, and together with the CSA has become the NPT safeguards norm (CSA + AP). For States following this norm, IAEA can provide assurance that all nuclear material remains in peaceful use. 

 IAEA has been performing safeguards in Iran since its CSA came into force in 1974, for over a half century. No diversion of declared nuclear material has been detected. However, there has been a lack of cooperation during the past two decades by Iran with IAEA, as Iran’s activities under an earlier clandestine nuclear weapon program were unearthed. The standoff resulted in numerous IAEA Board of Governors resolutions and reached the UN Security Council in 2006. It passed resolutions and placed sanctions on Iran. 

 Iran has twice put its AP in force “provisionally,” first during the 2003-2006 period, and again under a provision of JCPOA (Nuclear C.13). It stopped its “provisional” implementation in February 2021. The IAEA Board of Governors, States in the NPT Review process, and individual States have called for Iran to place its AP in force permanently, but Iran has not done so. Therefore today, IAEA can perform its safeguards in Iran only as it did at the time Iraq carried out its clandestine program. 

The lack of an AP in force is the most important open NPT issue with Iran today. “Getting to Iran’s AP” should be given high priority by NPT States, including the U.S. Richard Nephew wrote in his Foreign Affairs “If Iran will not fully meet the current standard of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and adhere to its Additional Protocol…Washington should walk.” 

 IAEA will continue to provide assurance of the peaceful use of Iran’s declared nuclear material and would provide timely notice of breakout. But, without the AP in force IAEA cannot provide the desired assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. 

                                                            JCPOA 

Extra-NPT restrictions have been negotiated with Iran, initially unsuccessfully by the E3 (France, Germany, UK) and then successfully with the European Union, China, Russia and U.S. added. This was done because those States considered that IAEA’s NPT peaceful use assurance and timely notification of diversion were insufficient for a “threshold nuclear” State, which Iran was judged to have become. They made the decision to address the Iran case directly, rather than to raise how threshold nuclear states should be dealt with within the NPT forum. They negotiated JCPOA with Iran, which was immediately given global recognition by endorsement in the UN Security Council (UNSC/RES/2231 (2015)). 

The principal objective of the E3/EU+3 in negotiating JCPOA was to place extra-NPT limitations on Iran’s stockpiles of enriched uranium and on its enrichment capacity so that, if Iran decided to “breakout”, it would need at least a year to have a nuclear weapon. (The plutonium route to a weapon was also blocked.) Iran’s enrichment developments since the U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA in 2018 have reduced its “breakout” time to some months. A new “deal” with Iran would increase the breakout time, probably through limitations on stockpiles and enrichment capability. 

                                                            Conclusions 

Iran’s obligations under the NPT are the foundation of assurance that its nuclear material remains in peaceful use. Iran needs to fully cooperate with IAEA under its CSA. In addition, NPT verification in Iran needs to be strengthened to meet the NPT safeguards norm of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol. NPT States and the IAEA Board of Governors needs to put pressure on Iran to fully meet its NPT obligations. 

 The increased assurance about Iran’s nuclear program provided by the extra-NPT provisions of JCPOA, especially through lengthening “breakout” time, has been lost. Successful negotiation of a new agreement could restore that assurance. It should be endorsed by the UN Security Council, as JCPOA was.