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Safeguards at Iran's bombed nuclear facilities

On Jan 23, 2026, Reuters published the response of Mohammad Eslami, Iran’s atomic chief, to the remark by IAEA DG Rafael Grossi in Davos ⁠on January 20 that the standoff ‌over inspections at bombed facilities at Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan "cannot go on forever", saying that IAEA has not formally outlined "a specific protocol" ‍for inspecting the damaged facilities: "When a military strike occurs and there are environmental risks, it must be defined and a guideline must be designed." 
        Here is a proposed approach. 
        Iran’s NPT safeguards agreement, based on INFCIRC/153, addresses the current situation where facilities in Iran containing safeguarded nuclear material have been bombed. Involved are special reports by Iran, special inspections by IAEA, and innovative application of safeguards measures. 

        1. Iran must make special reports to the IAEA (INFCIRC/153, paragraph 68). 
        2. IAEA should notify Iran of its intention to make special inspections (INFCIRC/153, paragraph 73). 
        3. IAEA should consult with Iran to obtain access for special inspections (INFCIRC/153, paragraph 77). 
        4. Where access to nuclear material for material accountancy is not granted by Iran, IAEA should make use of the complementary measures of containment and surveillance, (INFCIRC/153, paragraph 29). That might require continuous presence of inspectors. 

         INFCIRC/153, para 68, Special reports….the State shall make special reports without delay: (a) If any unusual incident or circumstances lead the State to believe that there is or may have been loss of nuclear material… (b) if the containment has been unexpectedly changed …to the extent that unauthorized removal of nuclear material has become possible. I
        NFCIRC/153, para 73, Purposes of inspections…the Agency may make special inspections subject to the procedures laid down in paragraph 77: (a) In order to verify the information contained in special reports; or (b) If the Agency considers that the information made available by the State…is not adequate for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under the Agreement. I
        NFCIRC/153, para 77, Access for inspections…in circumstances that may lead to. special inspections…the State and the Agency shall consult forthwith. As a result of those consultations the Agency may make inspections in addition to the routine inspection effort…and may obtain access in agreement with the State to information or locations in addition to the access…for ad hoc and routine inspections. Any disagreements concerning the need for additional access shall be resolved in accordance with paragraphs 21 and 22 (Settlement of Disputes); in case action by the State is essential and urgent, paragraph 18 (Measures in relation to verification of non-diversion) shall apply. 
        INFCIRC/153, para 29, Objective of safeguards. … provide for the use of material accountancy as a measure of fundamental importance, with containment and surveillance as important complementary measures.

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