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IAEA DG Grossi on the Iran nuclear conundrum

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi gave interviews in Davos to Reuters and to Bloomberg about the current situation with the Iran nuclear conundrum. Here is a summary of the reports on the interviews. 
        In a January 20 Davos interview with David Graham and Francois Murphy of Reuters Grossi said IAEA has inspected all 13 declared nuclear facilities in Iran that were not bombed. Inspections took place until late December, but it was not possible to carry out inspections during the civil unrest. 
        Grossi said that IAEA has been unable to inspect the three sites that were bombed in June — Natanz, Fordo or Isfahan. Iran has not submitted a special report to the IAEA, as foreseen in Iran’s NPT safeguards agreement, on what happened to those sites and material. It is now seven months since IAEA verified Iran’s stock of highly enriched uranium. Grossi said, “This cannot go on forever because at some point, I will have to say, ‘Well, I don’t have any idea where this material is,'” which would mean there was no guarantee the material had not been diverted or hidden, I do not have that conviction or conclusion at the moment.” 
        Grossi said he was exercising “diplomatic prudence,” but that Iran had to meet its obligations as a party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. “This cannot go on like this for a long time without me, unfortunately, having to declare them [to the IAEA Board of Governors] in non-compliance” with NPT. Asked if the issue could be resolved this spring, Grossi said: “That is a reasonable time frame.” 
        A “real world” reality that Grossi said he must face is the diplomatic effort aimed at reaching a broader agreement between Iran and the United States. “I cannot ignore it, and I wish it well so that there can be an understanding without the looming threat of new military activity over there or something of the sort.” 

        In a January 20 Davos interview with Johnathan Tirone and Joumanna Bercetche of Bloomberg, Grossi said talks with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi have failed to yield access to nuclear sites bombed by Israel and the US in June. Iran retains its stockpile of highly enriched uranium and would be able to rebuild its program. “It may take some time, but it can be done. The issue continues to be what are we going to do medium- to long-term in terms of providing a framework for a stable situation where it comes to Iran and its nuclear program,” i.e., how the Iran nuclear conundrum can be resolved. 

        We will stay tuned.

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