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No nuclear negotiations with Iran now

Richard Nephew, in a panel discussion on Jan 16, 2026, set up by Holly Dagress, said: restarting negotiations on [the Iranian nuclear] issue now would be a mistake. 
        He asserted that Iran’s ‘nuclear program remains an existential threat to the United States and the Middle East and will need to be addressed again at some point.’ 
        He believes that ‘new talks would likely require granting extensive sanctions relief, and […] it would be difficult to establish what Iran’s nuclear capabilities are after the United States and Israel struck the program last June.’
        But it seems that his main concern is that ‘engaging in such discussions amid mass repression could give the impression that Washington wants to legitimize a regime whose political legitimacy is irreparably damaged.’ 
        I think all that is great - the U.S. should stop trying to have the lead position in dealing with the Iran nuclear conundrum. In my view, it should be addressed in the framework of the NPT regime, using the IAEA and its Board of Governors (and the UN Security Council when useful), the NPT Review Process and initiatives by group(s) of non-nuclear NPT States. 
        What is the current status of Iran from an NPT verification perspective? I believe it must be accepted that it is a warzone. Trump and Netanyahu almost attacked Iran again last week and are likely to do so in the coming weeks, probably aimed primarily at overturning the regime but including further attacks on nuclear sites. 
        Hopefully the IAEA Secretariat is developing an approach to verification that, while not perfect, gives an acceptable solution under the warzone conditions in Iran.

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