ISIS has published its analysis of the IAEA’s report on new developments on the clandestine nuclear program in Syria. As I wrote on August 20, more details “can be expected to be discussed in the next DG report to the IAEA Board of Governors.”
In my August 20 blog, I went into what it would mean if the disclosed nuclear material was above the ‘starting point of safeguards’ or before that point. What has been revealed makes most of that not relevant or applicable.
To my surprise, the material is in the form of some 8,800 fabricated natural uranium metal fuel elements intended as the first core loading of the clandestine DPRK-duplicate graphite moderated, carbon dioxide cooled plutonium production reactor.
Yes, that was undeclared nuclear material that had to be reported to the IAEA under Syria’s NPT safeguards agreement. Now it will be (or has already been) declared by Syria and become part of its declared nuclear material under IAEA safeguards.
What is done with those fuel rods is outside the IAEA verification scope, as long as the uranium remains under IAEA safeguards.
But Israel, and maybe the U.S., may not be satisfied unless those fuel elements are removed from Syria. Perhaps the U.S. will give a good price and buy them from Syria. Hopefully, Israel will not bomb the facility where they are stored.
As ISIS director David Albright wrote, “the recent breakthrough should be celebrated.” It is indeed good news that another clandestine nuclear program carried out under the NPT has been brought into the light of day.
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