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Another Iran Resolution by IAEA Board of Governors?

        Today Reuters headlined: 
                                                    Trump says US may hit Iran's Pickaxe Mountain soon. 
        Meanwhile, on the ‘diplomatic’ front, in advance of the September Board of Governors meeting next week, Reuters has reported that the U.S. is again leading a push for another Board resolution on Iran. This would follow Board Iran resolutions in June 2025, November 2025 and June 2026. This fourth one is the ‘clincher’; it would move the Iran nuclear case back onto the UN Security Council agenda, after a 20-year pause. 
        Why a Board resolution now? Why bomb Pickaxe now? 
        They couldn’t be related to escalating the U.S.-Israel war on Iran before the midterms could they? Oh no. The resolution is just taking the proper action in an NPT noncompliance case. Iran is not allowing IAEA inspector access for verification of its declared nuclear material, as it is obligated to under its NPT safeguards agreement with IAEA. 
        Why isn’t Iran granting IAEA that access? 
        The United States and Israel ‘obliterated’ Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities in June 2025. But what happened to the enriched uranium that IAEA had verified at those sites shortly before the June bombing remains known only to Iran, Well, it wouldn’t be surprising if Mossad has found out, would it? The fact that Israel has not seriously bombed nuclear sites further suggests that much or most of the highly enriched uranium is deep underground at Isfahan. Maybe. Or maybe some is under Pickaxe mountain.     
        Will the IAEA Board of Governors take into consideration that IAEA is not able to perform verification because Iran is a war zone? 
        Iran, and we, know that if Israel and the U.S. were to find out through IAEA inspection how much uranium is where, they have publicly said that they would bomb again. Trump wants to bomb Pickaxe now. 
        The IAEA Board Iran resolutions have repeatedly called for “a diplomatic solution”, “encouraging all parties to constructively engage in diplomacy.” How about the U.S. doing diplomacy rather than UN Security Council referral and military actions? Wouldn’t it be laudable if the Trump administration would seriously do diplomacy? But we don’t expect that Israel will “engage constructively,’ at least not while it is run by PM Netanyahu. 
        For the record, here are excerpts from the IAEA Board of Governors resolutions on Iran. (I have included the mention of the Additional Protocol in the November 2025 resolution. That’s the AP that Saudi Arabia (and Argentina and Brazil and Egypt) will not adopt. ) 

U.S. Proposed Resolution for September 2026 Board of Governors Meeting (as reported by Reuters, Sep 4, 2026) 
        (The board) requests the (IAEA) Director General to transmit this resolution and the previously adopted resolutions ... to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
        "Reiterates its call upon Iran to urgently remedy ‌its non-compliance ⁠with its Safeguards Agreement…". 

Implementation of NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran GOV/2026/40 (10 June 2026) 
Affirms that it is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran act to fulfil its legal obligations and take the following actions without delay: 
            i. Provide the Agency with complete information on nuclear material inventories and design information for facilities and 
            ii. Grant the Agency all access it requires to verify this information; 
8. Reiterates its call upon Iran to urgently remedy its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement ,
10. Underlines its support for a diplomatic solution to the challenges posed by the Iranian nuclear programme and its implications for regional peace and stability; 

NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran GOV/2025/71 (20 Nov 2025) 
(n) Expressing continuing support for a diplomatic solution… 
4. Urges Iran to comply fully and without delay with its legal obligations under the above mentioned UNSC resolutions and to extend full and prompt cooperation to the IAEA, … 
5. Reiterates that Iran must comply fully and without qualification with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, …; 
6. Calls upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol that it signed on 18 December 2003, and to fully implement this measure without delay; 

NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran GOV/2025/38 (12 June 2025)  
3. Finds that Iran’s many failures to uphold its obligations since 2019 to provide the Agency with full and timely cooperation regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple undeclared locations in Iran, as detailed in GOV/2025/25 constitutes non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute; 
10. Calls upon Iran to urgently remedy its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement …; 
11. Stresses its support for a diplomatic solution to the problems posed by the Iranian nuclear programme, …, encouraging all parties to constructively engage in diplomacy;

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