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IAEA and the UN Security Council address Iran

        Not surprisingly, Al Jazeera gave the fullest reporting on the nuclear-related developments with Iran on September 10. Their headline and subtitles were: 
        IAEA accuses Iran of ‘noncompliance’ 
                What has the IAEA accused Iran of? 
                How has Iran responded? 
                What is the UN Security Council expected to do? 
                What impact could this have on the US war against Iran? 
                What is the IAEA's history with Iran? 
Iran International also posted on Sep 10 reports on numerous related developments. 
Here is a summary of main points: 
• The [IAEA] Board of Governors … has passed a resolution accusing Iran of failing to comply with its nuclear nonproliferation commitments and referring the matter to the UN Security Council (UNSC). It is the first time in 20 years that the IAEA board has passed such a resolution. 
• France, Germany, Britain and the United States said the resolution they introduced was intended to complete a procedural step required under the IAEA Statute following the Board’s June 2025 finding of Iranian non-compliance.
• The IAEA resolution expresses "grave concern" over Iran's "continued noncompliance" with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
• Interestingly, the resolution called on Iran "to engage seriously and without preconditions in talks aimed at building international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme". [All parties could have been ‘called on’, rather than just Iran.] 
• Ali Vaez, of the International Crisis Group, told AFP that the IAEA resolution is ultimately "an exercise in futility", with Russia and China "likely to ensure that Western pressure hits a wall at the Security Council". 
• Iran has condemned the resolution: "This resolution was passed under political pressure from the US and its allies and in our view has no basis.” "They attack Iran's safeguarded nuclear facilities, disrupt the normal verification process, and then use that very disruption as a pretext to pass a resolution at the IAEA Board of Governors.” 
• IAEA has not had access to key nuclear facilities in Iran since the US and Israel launched a 12-day war against Iran in June 2025, which included attacks on key Iranian nuclear enrichment sites, Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. 
• Iran stated it has been unable to provide inspectors safe access to its nuclear sites due to the ongoing conflict. "Performance is currently impossible under continuing military operations and persistent threats". However, Iran has "neither stopped nor suspended its safeguards obligations." 
 • [IAEA] has observed new construction activity at Iran's Pickaxe Mountain, a large heavily fortified underground tunnel complex built into granite. US President Donald Trump renewed threats to target Pickaxe Mountain. Trump said the US had observed "a little activity" there and would "advise Iran not to get cute because we will have to hit them very hard". 
• Iran’s Supreme National Security Council secretary said on Sep 10 that the [IAEA’s] “political moves” would push countries to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A member of Iran’s parliament presiding board said, “It is natural for Iran to seek a review and reassessment of any further cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency or any other institution in the nuclear field.” 
• The UN Security Council on Sep 10 held a briefing on the committee overseeing UN sanctions on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, which France, Germany and the United Kingdom moved to restore in August 2025 by triggering the JCPOA snapback mechanism. Britain said that six Security Council resolutions on Iran, including Resolution 1737, were put back in force. 
• No formal committee report was presented at the meeting because China and Russia opposed its adoption and reject the legal validity of the snapback mechanism. Russia’s representative said there were “no grounds” for the committee to resume its work and argued that Resolution 2231 (which endorsed JCPOA) expired on October 18, 2025. “The Russian Federation is against this briefing.” China’s representative also said there was no basis for resuming the committee’s activities.

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