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Trump’s threats imperil Islamabad MOU negotiations

Paragraph 1 of the Islamabad MOU, signed by President Donald Trump at Versailles a few days ago, includes: 
        1 — The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran … undertake … to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other… 

    The start of negotiations in Switzerland today seemed to be going well, with Vice President Vance telling reporters President Trump had: 
            "asked us to turn over a new leaf to transform our relationship with the people of Iran". 
    But then, on Sunday, June 21, President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social: 
            "Iran must immediately stop their highly paid PROXIES in ‌Lebanon ⁠from causing trouble. If they don’t, ⁠we’ll hit Iran very hard again, just ⁠like we did last ⁠week, only harder!!!" 
    Further, Trump told Iranian officials, according to Fox News: 
            "You close [the Strait of Hormuz] and you won't have a country. You won't even make it back to your fu*king country. We may take over the Strait, if we have to." 
    
    It should come as no surprise, after Trump so blatantly violated the commitment he made under MOU paragraph 1, that the first session of the talks between Iran and the United States halted following roughly 80 minutes of indirect discussions. 
    Press TV reported that Iran's delegation has lodged a protest with the US after Trump's threats and is weighing its next steps, “Whether the negotiations will continue remains unclear.” 

    Look again at MOU paragraph 1. What else can one say about the Iranian response to Trump’s threats but ‘Bravo”!

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