The four-week NPT Review Conference has taken place and ended May 22, for the third consecutive time, without an agreed Outcome Document. Nevertheless, the drafts of that document are public, starting with the Zero Draft introduced by the Conference President, and four subsequent drafts.
Here is a summary of how four international safeguards topics were dealt with, followed by the draft texts for those topics: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); Compliance and Iran; Additional Protocol; Attacks on nuclear facilities
1. IAEA
While the principal text on the importance of IAEA is standard, it is good that the text did evolve to “call on all States parties to ensure that IAEA continues to have the necessary political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively apply safeguards.”
2. Compliance and Iran
This bracketed paragraph was largely responsible for the lack of consensus on the Outcome Document. As I understand it, the US insisted Iran be explicitly mentioned, and Iran withheld its agreement because of the inclusion of its name. There was extensive redrafting between revisions, in which these concerns raised by the Iran nuclear conundrum for the NPT regime did get mentioned:
• States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with safeguards obligations should direct such concerns… to IAEA to consider and decide on necessary actions;
• Support… a diplomatic solution to resolve concerns regarding the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme; and
• Emphasizes [the need for] full and timely cooperation with the IAEA regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple undeclared locations.
But there is no ‘strongly urge’ demand that Iran get back to fully meeting its NPT obligations. And the opportunity is missed to call for action be taken to address the new situation of performing IAEA safeguards in a conflict zone.
3. Additional Protocol
The principal text on the role of the Additional Protocol is standard, as is the call “to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible.” What is regrettable is that the following text in the Zero Draft was omitted: “the case of a non-nuclear-weapon State party with a comprehensive safeguards agreement supplemented by an additional protocol in force, the measures contained in both instruments represent the enhanced verification standard for that State.” What I have been promoting for years is that a CSA plus an AP IS the NPT verification standard, and all non-nuclear NPT States should be strongly urged to adopt that standard.
4. Attacks on nuclear facilities
The final text dropped explicit mention of Iran but it is good that the text evolved from “calls upon States parties to exercise maximum restraint” to “strongly urge all States parties to refrain from attacks or threats of attack.”
Outcome Document NPT.CONF.2026/CRP.2
Comparison of final Rev.4 with earlier drafts.
1. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Outcome Documents Rev.3 and Rev.4
14. Reaffirm that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in
accordance with the IAEA Statute and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance by States
parties with the safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under
Article III, paragraph 1 of the Treaty, reaffirm that safeguards should be implemented in a
manner consistent with Article III, paragraph 3 and Article IV of the Treaty, and call on all
States parties to ensure that IAEA continues to have the necessary political, technical and
financial support so that it is able to effectively apply safeguards required in connection with
article III of the Treaty.
Outcome Document Rev.2
5. The Conference reaffirms that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for
verifying and assuring, in accordance with the IAEA Statute and the IAEA safeguards
system, compliance by States parties with the safeguards agreements undertaken in
fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1 of the Treaty, with a view to
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices. No action should be taken to undermine the authority of IAEA
in this regard.
Outcome Document Draft Zero
5. The Conference reaffirms that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for
verifying and assuring, in accordance with the IAEA Statute and the IAEA safeguards
system, compliance by States parties with the safeguards agreements undertaken in
fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1 of the Treaty, with a view to
preventing diversion of nuclear material…
2. Compliance and Iran
Outcome Documents Rev.3 and Rev.4 [bracketed]
15. [Underscore the importance of compliance by States parties with the non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty and of addressing all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in a timely manner and in full conformity with the Statute of IAEA and the parties’ respective legal obligations, express serious concern with unresolved non-compliance with obligations under safeguards agreements and its repercussions for the non-proliferation regime, call for a prompt return to compliance through the full, timely and effective implementation of safeguards obligations, and emphasize, in this context, that Iran can never seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.]
Outcome Document Rev.2
6. The Conference underscores the importance of compliance by States parties with the non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty and the importance of addressing all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in a timely manner and in full conformity with the Statute of IAEA and the parties’ respective legal obligations. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with safeguards obligations should direct such concerns, together with supporting information, to IAEA to consider and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.
Outcome Document Rev.1
7. The Conference expresses its concern regarding unresolved outstanding safeguards issues and non-compliance with obligations under safeguards agreements. In this context, the Conference stresses its support for a diplomatic solution to resolve concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear programme and encourages all parties to engage constructively for this purpose. The Conference emphasizes that the full and effective implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, including full and timely cooperation with the IAEA regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple undeclared locations, is indispensable to restoring confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.
Outcome Document Draft Zero
6. The Conference underscores the importance of compliance by States parties with the non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty and the importance of addressing all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in a timely manner and in full conformity with the Statute of IAEA and the respective legal obligations of States parties. States parties that have concerns regarding compliance with safeguards obligations should be directed, together with supporting information, to IAEA for consideration and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.
7. The Conference stresses its support for a diplomatic solution to resolve concerns regarding the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme and encourages all parties to engage constructively for this purpose. The Conference expresses concerns over the finding of the IAEA Board of Governors of Iran’s non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with IAEA. The Conference emphasizes that the full and effective implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, including full and timely cooperation with the IAEA regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple undeclared locations, is indispensable to restoring confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.
3. Additional Protocol
Outcome Documents Rev.3 and Rev.4
17. Recall that it is the voluntary, sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol, but once in force, the additional protocol is a legal obligation, note the importance of the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards, and encourage all States which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.
Outcome Document Rev.2
13. Bearing in mind that it is the voluntary, sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol, but once in force, the additional protocol is a legal obligation, the Conference encourages all States which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force in conformity with their national legislation.
Outcome Document Draft Zero
12. The Conference notes that the decision to conclude an additional protocol remains a sovereign decision of each State and that, once in force, an additional protocol constitutes a legal obligation. The Conference notes that implementation of the measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) equips IAEA with broader information and access, enabling it to provide increased assurances
regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement as a whole. The Conference notes that in the case of a non-nuclear-weapon State party with a comprehensive safeguards agreement supplemented by an additional protocol in force, the measures contained in both instruments represent the enhanced verification standard for that State.
13. The Conference encourages all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.
4. Attacks on nuclear facilities
Outcome Document Rev.4
34. Express grave concern over attacks or threats of attack against nuclear facilities
devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes, which could jeopardize nuclear safety and
nuclear security, pose a great danger to human lives and the environment and raise
serious concerns regarding the violation of international law, including the Charter of
the United Nations and international humanitarian law, note the relevant IAEA General
Conference resolutions and decision on this matter, and strongly urge all States parties
to refrain from attacks or threats of attack on such facilities, consistent with their
obligations under international law.
Outcome Document Rev.2
42. The Conference expresses grave concerns over any attack or threat of attack
against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes, which could pose a great danger
to human lives and the environment, jeopardize nuclear safety and nuclear security, and
raises serious concerns regarding the violation of international law, including the Charter
of the United Nations and international humanitarian law. The Conference notes the
relevant IAEA General Conference resolutions and decision on this matter and strongly
urges all States parties to refrain from attacks or threats of attack on such facilities.
Outcome Document Zero Draft
8. The Conference notes the grave concerns expressed at the attacks on Iranian
nuclear facilities and calls upon States parties to exercise maximum restraint to avoid
such attacks.
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