During the U.S./Israel war on Iran since February 28, it has been rather quiet on the nuclear front. Only a few, limited bombings of the Natanz and Esfahan sites have been reported. Iranian activity at those sites has been limited, as detected through public satellite imagery. Now that U.S.-Iran talks are starting to sound like negotiation of a so-called deal, it is perhaps worthwhile to resume commentary on the Iran nuclear conundrum.
We will start with ‘unpacking’ a statement by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi on April 15 in South Korea, and a comment by President Donald Trump on April 16.
Rafael Grossi told reporters in Seoul [Apr 15]: “Iran has a very ambitious, wide nuclear program so all of that will require the presence of IAEA inspectors. Otherwise, you will not have an agreement. You will have an illusion of an agreement.” He said that any agreement on nuclear technology “requires very detailed verification mechanisms.”
Rafael Grossi is travelling the world as he campaigns to become UN Secretary General as an experienced Argentine diplomat. So his statements, like this one, should be understood in that context. The UN Security Council has the mandate for international peace and security; IAEA does not. In nonproliferation, IAEA has a mandate under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to verify that NPT non-nuclear-weapon states are complying with their NPT undertakings. IAEA was given the additional mandate by the UN Security Council to verify nuclear obligations of Iran under the UN Security Council endorsed JCPOA. JCPOA is over, and with it, so is that IAEA mandate.
Therefore, a statement by the IAEA Director General should address only NPT obligations, for all NPT signatories including Iran.
With that background, Grossi’s statement should be understood to be calling only for Iran to return to fully implementing its NPT safeguards agreement with IAEA. Iran has not been doing that, justified by the wartime conditions and attacks on nuclear facilities by Israel and the United States. Grossi should be calling for Israel and the U.S. to stop threatening further attacks on Iranian nuclear sites. Only when that occurs, can it be expected that Iran will resume full IAEA safeguards implementation. Since PM Netanyahu has made crystal clear that Israel intends to continue ‘mowing the lawn’ in Iran, do not hold your breath for Iran to restore IAEA inspections.
Beyond that, Grossi’s use of “agreement” is probably being [mis]understood to mean a new agreement possibly to be negotiated by the U.S. with Iran. In principle, such a bilateral agreement is independent of NPT and therefore is none of the IAEA’s - or its DG’s - business, unless it calls for IAEA monitoring and verification of its terms and gets UN Security Council endorsement and mandating IAEA to carry out such functions. [The U.S. probably will try to negotiate U.S. inspectors verifying such a bilateral agreement, rather than IAEA inspectors, to be independent of the United Nations.]
President Trump told reporters Thursday [Apr 16]: “They’ve [Iran] agreed to give us back the nuclear dust that’s way underground because of the attack we made with the B-2 bombers,”
Does Trump understand what the U.S. B-2 bombers did in June 2025? I doubt it, and the Iranians may well be playing him and his real estate buddies with that. We know what the seven B-2’s, each carrying two of the world’s largest conventional bunker buster weapons, did. Their objective was to drop 6 into each of two air vents of the underground Fordow uranium enrichment facility; and remarkably they did that. The seventh B-2 was in reserve, in case one of the six had a problem; when all went well, the last B-2 proceeded on to drop its two bunker busters into the underground uranium enrichment facility at Natanz.
So what? Well, the B-2’s did not attack the underground tunnel complex at Esfahan, because it is too deep for the bunker busters to reliably reach. So, the navy sent 20 Tomahawk cruise missiles to blast the three entrances to that tunnel complex. And in those tunnels there is now some part of the 440 kg 60% enriched uranium. DG Grossi has publicly stated that about half, and maybe more, is there.
Is it all there, or where is the rest? The Iranians know. The Israeli and American intelligence services are no doubt devoting a lot of effort on finding out. This is one case where the Iranians do ‘have the cards’.
Again, so what? Well, Trump likes to use the phrase ‘nuclear dust’ because the bunker busters delivered by the B-2’s ‘obliterated’ Fordow. So, the Iranians can agree to perhaps jointly dig out Fordow with the Americans to recover what ‘nuclear dust’ they can recover there. That can sound like a Trump victory. Hooray!
But what about what is under the ground at Esfahan, and possibly or probably elsewhere? Reporting about the Iranian-U.S. exchanges has mentioned that Iran is discussing possibly diluting enriched uranium or sending part of it to a third country (Russia). Would that be the material at Esfahan? Seems likely.
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