Phillip Gordon on Iran Nuclear

        An article by Phillip Gordon of Brookings published today, October 12, by Foreign Affairs, titled America Shouldn’t Let Go of the Middle East, included several paragraphs about nuclear in Iran worth commenting on. The full paragraphs are below. Here are my comments on three key sentences. 

Iran would simply forgo the nuclear option. 

        The absence of any mention of Iran being an NPT non-nuclear weapon state, which involves its commitment to ‘forgo the nuclear option’, is indicative of a blind spot in Washington policy think tanks. In their thinking, the U.S. is dominant; the strong decide what the weak must accept or do. The idea that States (governments) could be relied on to do what they say when they sign an international treaty is considered naïve or something worse. After all, the U.S. only lives up to its treaty commitments when it suits it. 

        What Gordon should address but does not is that Iran had taken steps to achieve a ‘threshold’ nuclear status within the NPT. What needs to be addressed and acted on is how to get Iran to stop doing that. Guess what? The JCPOA in 2015 did that! Iran backed away from its threshold status. Then Trump in 2018 destroyed JCPOA, with the result that Iran returned to threshold status. Why did Iran do that? Because of threats from Israel and the U.S. which culminated in the 2025 war and the 2026 war initiated by Israel and the U.S., with regime change as their real objective.  Why did Trump kill JCPOA? Who would trust him with a new agreement? That is where the crux of the Iran conundrum lies. 

Washington could live with an Iranian bomb. 

        Here it is: The U.S. is dominant; the strong decide what the weak are allowed to do. If Iran were to decide to withdraw from NPT and develop nuclear weapons, as North Korea did, the U.S. - alone - would then decide whether to accept that or not. What about the NPT regime? What about the neighboring countries that would be directly impacted by Iranian nuclear weapons? Is it too much for the U.S. to give them a voice? Answer: yes. 

[The U.S.] bombing Iran every few years. 

        Here it is again: The U.S. is dominant; the strong decide what the weak have to take. The U.S., together with its ally Israel, will ‘mow the grass’ in Iran whenever they feel like it. No mention of being a member of the United Nations with the obligations of the UN Charter, or of following international law. But this threat is new, this is Trump: ‘I can do anything I want. I can bomb anyone I want at any time.’ Is that the America you grew up in? 

        So, think about the title: America Shouldn’t Let Go of the Middle East. U.S. dominance at its boldest. The question should be: how can the U.S. and other states help to develop a stable security situation in the Middle East so that no state (including Israel) considers a need for nuclear weapons, 

Phillip Gordon on Iran Nuclear in America Shouldn’t Let Go of the Middle East, Foreign Affairs, October 2026 

        Some scholars … believe that with the threat of U.S. military intervention removed or reduced, Iran would simply forgo the nuclear option, so there is little to worry about. But no American president is likely to bet on it, and for good reason. A nuclear Iran would know it could maintain or increase its support for proxy forces and its meddling in its neighbors’ affairs, or escalate its conflict with Israel, confident that its arsenal would deter any attempt to overthrow the regime in response. 

        And if Iran got the bomb its regional neighbors would likely try to do so, as well…Saudi Arabia… Turkey .... A Middle East with multiple nuclear powers, many of them rivals, would be far more dangerous than it is today, with a higher risk of a nuclear accident or nuclear weapons use. 

        The logic of U.S. disengagement from the region implies that Washington could live with an Iranian bomb, as it lives with Pakistan’s and North Korea’s, and perhaps it could. But most Americans would probably prefer never to find out. 

        To preserve its interests in the region without getting dragged into war, the United States should return to diplomacy as the primary tool for preventing an Iranian bomb. Iran’s skepticism that Washington would honor any new agreement will make that difficult. After the war ends, a weakened, isolated regime that wants to rebuild its economy, avoid repeated wars, and forestall domestic unrest will eventually need a modus vivendi with its neighbors and Western powers, and that will require verifiable limits on its nuclear program. 

        Those who say it is too late for coercive diplomacy—such as sanctions and incentives, backed by a broad coalition and a credible threat of force—should consider the alternatives: bombing Iran every few years or accepting an Iranian bomb. The 2015 deal, whatever its limits, was a more effective way to constrain and monitor Iran’s nuclear program than a war that left it with a greater incentive to pursue nuclear weapons, enough highly enriched uranium for a dozen such weapons, plenty of nuclear know-how, and no inspectors on the ground. A similar deal is unlikely any time soon, which is why deterrence must be maintained, but it will have to be part of any long-term solution.