The IAEA has published part of its annual report on the international safeguards it carried out in 2025. (The entire confidential report is distributed to governments,) In it there is a nice summary of IAEA's interactions with Iran in 2025. It explains that Iran was declared to be in noncompliance with its NPT safeguards agreement with IAEA and has not remedied that noncompliance, and that lack of information and access to the bombed nuclear enrichment facilities constitutes a "proliferation concern." Here it is.
A. Safeguards Statement for 2025 In 2025, safeguards were applied for 190 States with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. Forty-four States had comprehensive safeguards agreements in force, but no additional protocols in force.
Islamic Republic of Iran
For one State [Iran], the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear
material and no indication of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material
at declared facilities and LOFs not affected by the military attacks of June 2025. On
this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for this State, declared nuclear material at
these facilities and LOFs remained in peaceful activities. This conclusion does not
apply to nuclear material — previously declared by the State at certain facilities
affected by the above-mentioned military attacks — which the Agency was unable to
verify. Therefore, the Agency could not draw any conclusion regarding this nuclear material. This gives rise to a proliferation concern as this nuclear material, which the Agency was not able to verify, includes a large amount of high enriched uranium.
B. Background to the Safeguards Statement and Summary
Islamic Republic of Iran
As requested by the Board of Governors (Board) in its resolution GOV/2024/68 (adopted by a vote), in May 2025, the Director General provided to the Board for its consideration a “comprehensive and updated assessment on the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme”. The report identified a number of unresolved safeguards issues related to Iran not declaring nuclear material and nuclear-related activities at undeclared locations; the possible presence of undeclared nuclear material in Iran; and Iran’s limited cooperation with the Agency to address the outstanding safeguards issues.
The Board considered the Director General’s report and, on 12 June 2025, adopted (by a vote)
resolution GOV/2025/38 in which the Board, inter alia, found that Iran’s failures to uphold its
obligations constituted “non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement” and called upon Iran to “urgently remedy its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement”.
On 13 June 2025, the Director General reported to the Board and to the United Nations Security Council that the Agency had been informed of a military operation launched by Israel that included attacks on several of Iran’s nuclear facilities. These attacks took place between 13 and 24 June 2025. On 22 June 2025, the United States of America conducted attacks on three of Iran’s nuclear facilities.
The Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran at the commencement of the military attacks and, by the end of June 2025, had decided to withdraw all of its inspectors from Iran for safety reasons.
In his statement to the Board on 13 June 2025, the Director General, inter alia, recalled relevant General Conference resolutions, in particular GC(XXIX)/RES/444 and GC(XXXIV)/RES/533, which provided, inter alia, that “any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency”.
On 2 July 2025, the President of Iran signed into force a law suspending cooperation with the Agency. While the Agency acknowledged that the military attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities had created an unprecedented situation, the Agency made clear to Iran that it was critical for the Agency to conduct verification activities in Iran in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement. To this end, the Director General presented a number of concrete steps, expressed the Agency’s readiness to discuss with Iran the modalities for accessing affected facilities, and indicated the Agency’s readiness to take into account Iran’s security concerns. This approach remained consistent with the rights and obligations of Iran and the Agency under the NPT Safeguards Agreement.
Between August and December 2025, the Agency conducted a number of inspections and design information verifications at declared nuclear facilities in Iran that had not been affected by the military attacks.
On 9 September 2025, the Director General signed an agreement with the Foreign Minister of Iran, Dr Abbas Araghchi, in Cairo on ‘Practical Steps on Safeguards Implementation in Iran pursuant to the NPT Safeguards Agreement following the armed attacks on its safeguarded nuclear facilities’ (Cairo agreement) that provided an understanding of the procedures for Agency inspections, notifications and safeguards implementation covering all declared nuclear facilities and nuclear material in Iran including the provision by Iran of a report for the affected facilities and associated nuclear material. On 7 November 2025, the Agency reminded Iran that the provision by Iran “without delay” of the aforementioned report is a requirement under the NPT Safeguards Agreement,19 and which Iran had agreed to provide under the Cairo agreement.
The Board, in its resolution GOV/2025/71 of 20 November 2025 (adopted by a vote), requested the Director General, inter alia, to “report before each regular quarterly Board meeting on the implementation of Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement, and implement and report on the provisions of all relevant Security Council resolutions, including 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010), consistent with past practice”. In these resolutions, the United Nations Security Council decided, inter alia, that Iran shall suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear activities:
• all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency;
• work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the Agency;
• provide such access and cooperation as the Agency requests to be able to verify such suspension; and
• comply fully and without qualification with the NPT Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code 3.1;
and it called upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol that it signed on 18 December 2003 and to ratify it promptly.
On 20 November 2025, Iran informed the Director General that the Cairo agreement was “no longer valid and shall henceforth be regarded as terminated”. While the Agency was able to resume safeguards verification activities at declared facilities unaffected by the military attacks, Iran did not provide the Agency with declarations, reports or access in relation to any of its declared nuclear facilities that had been affected by, or subjected to, military attacks. Therefore, the Agency has not been able to fulfil its obligations under the NPT Safeguards Agreement in relation to these facilities and associated nuclear material.
Iran continued not to implement modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its NPT Safeguards Agreement, which remains a legal obligation for Iran, or to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol, as called upon to do in Board resolution GOV/2025/71.
During 2025, the Director General submitted four quarterly reports to the Board entitled NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2025/10, GOV/2025/25, GOV/2025/53 and GOV/2025/65).
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